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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Dan Ross died in 1990 at the age of 46 after a long and painful fight with brain 
cancer.1  For decades, Dan worked at the Conoco Chemical and Condea Vista plant 
in Louisiana in a job that repeatedly exposed him to the dangerous chemical vinyl 
chloride.2  Convinced that this exposure caused Dan’s terminal brain cancer, Dan’s 
wife, Elaine, filed a wrongful death action against his employer.3  Documents 
produced during discovery prior to settlement of the case revealed that the chemical 
industry had known for decades that its products could be harmful to its employees.4   
                                                                
1Chemical Industry Archives, In Memory of Dan Ross (1944 to 1990), 
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/about/dedication.asp (last visited Sept.. 24, 2005) 
[hereinafter Dan Ross].  This website provides a dedication to the memory of Dan Ross by 
publishing an archive of chemical industry documents that were revealed during the discovery 
phase of the wrongful death suit his wife brought against Conoco (now Vista).  The website 
also provides general information about the chemical industry in America and dangerous 
chemicals that workers may be exposed to in the workplace.  
2Id.  Vinyl chloride is a dangerous reality for chemical workers who are exposed to it on a 
daily basis; exposure causes disintegration of finger bones, fatal liver cancers, and other types 
of cancers. Chemical Industry Archives, The Inside Story: Vinyl Chloride, 
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/dirtysecrets/vinyl/1.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2005) 
[hereinafter Vinyl Chloride].  As early as 1959, a Dow scientist concluded “we feel quite 
confident . . . that 500 ppm [of vinyl chloride] is going to produce rather appreciable injury 
when inhaled 7 hours a day, five days a week for an extended period.” Id.  The Conoco plant 
where Dan Ross worked is located in Louisiana, which, as of 1998, was the third ranked state 
in highest vinyl chloride emissions. Id.  Louisiana has ten facilities, which emitted over 
125,000 pounds of vinyl chloride emissions in 1998. Id.  
3Dan Ross, supra note 1. 
4Id.  Although Elaine Ross settled her suit against Conoco, she allowed her lawyer, 
William Baggett, Jr., to bring a separate suit against companies and trade associations in the 
American Chemistry Council. Id.  This latter suit alleged that companies “conspired to 
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For many years, the chemical industry has tried to conceal knowledge of product 
dangers from its employees, consumers, and the general public, all to the detriment 
of workers’ safety.5  The actions of the chemical industry exemplify why employees 
need to have increased access to information concerning workplace safety risks and 
an effective channel for addressing workplace safety issues and injuries.  Currently, 
when chemical workers like Dan Ross suffer workplace injuries, they look to 
legislation and litigation for relief, neither of which provides a complete solution to 
the problem of workplace safety.  I propose an alternative vehicle—employee board 
representation in the chemical industry—that will provide workers at risk for 
chemical exposure injuries6 access to vital safety information and a forum for 
advocating  improved workplace safety.   
In Part II of this note, I analyze the impact of tort litigation, workers’ 
compensation, collective bargaining, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act on 
workplace safety.  I begin by describing how each of these vehicles operated 
historically and then I provide a contemporary perspective.  In this section, I also 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of using these approaches to prevent and 
compensate for injuries.  In Part III, I propose an alternative approach to workplace 
                                                          
withhold crucial information about dangers of vinyl chloride from workers, government 
regulators, and the public.” Id.  Baggett later filed three other such conspiracy suits; all four 
suits are still in the process of adjudication. Id.  
5
 Vinyl Chloride, supra note 2 (explaining that although the chemical industry began 
discovering the many dangers of vinyl chloride over thirty years ago, it continued to withhold 
that information from unknowing workers, who are still dying from overexposure). 
6Workers in the chemical industry are exposed to harmful chemicals daily, putting them at 
continuous risk of developing occupational injuries and illnesses from chemical exposure.  
The harm that these workers may experience depends on the intensity and length of exposure, 
as well as the worker’s “own individual susceptibility.” Francis H. Miller, Biological 
Monitoring: The Employer’s Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 387, 389 (1984).  Although the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration issues standards for the levels of exposure 
permitted for chemicals in the workplace, it is unable to keep pace with the thousands of 
chemicals handled by chemical workers each year. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 2 (1989).  New information is constantly being discovered relating to safe exposure 
levels and unknown potential affects.  In fact, recent studies have revealed that although U.S. 
occupational guidelines limit exposure for the chemical benzene, one of the most commonly 
used chemicals in the industry, to one part per million, even lower amounts may be harmful to 
those exposed. Benzene Causes Lowered Blood Cell Counts in Workers Exposed at Low 
Levels, STATE NEWS SERV., Dec. 2, 2004.  As explained by Dr. David A. Estmond, professor 
of environmental toxicology at the University of California, “These results clearly indicate 
that the current OSHA permissible exposure limit is not sufficiently protective of worker 
health.” Andrew C. Revkin, Broad Study Suggests a Lower Tolerance for Exposure to 
Benzene, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at A20.  
The case of hexavalent chromium provides another example of an OSHA standard lagging 
behind actual present day exposure risks of a certain chemical. U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control & Prevention; Lung Cancer Risk from Hexavalent Chromium Exposure Assessed, 
LAB BUS. WEEK, February 20, 2005, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years.  
Hexavalent chromium is used in the chromate industry and poses risks to workers when they 
are exposed to hexavalent-chromium-containing dusts and mists. Id.  A recent scientific study 
reveals, “current occupational standards for hexavalent chromium permit a lifetime excess risk 
of dying of lung cancer that exceeds 1 in 10.” Id.     
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safety: employee board representation.  In this section, I analyze and critique various 
methods of employee board representation and ultimately recommend a form of 
representation in which an outside professional hired to represent worker safety 
issues serves on the board of directors.  I advocate this model as an effective means 
for providing workers in the chemical industry with critical safety information and a 
channel for improving workplace safety.  
II.  ADDRESSING WORKPLACE SAFETY ISSUES IN AMERICA 
A.  Tort Litigation 
1.  Historically 
Before legislatures enacted workers’ compensation statutes around 1910, workers 
such as Dan Ross relied solely on tort suits to recover for workplace injuries.7  Tort 
suits were based on a system of common law negligence liability.8  Under the 
negligence system, an employer was held liable for a worker’s injury when the 
employer was found to be at fault for the injury.9  The potential success of tort claims 
rose with the expansion of the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Under the expanded 
doctrine of respondeat superior, employers became liable in tort for injuries 
occurring in the course of employment and caused by the negligence of any one of 
their employees.10  
However, the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk 
limited workers’ ability to recover against their employers in tort suits for workplace 
injuries.11  If the injured worker was determined to have been negligent in any way, 
the doctrine of contributory negligence completely barred recovery.12  Recovery was 
also barred under the doctrine of assumption of the risk if the suit involved a risk of 
employment of which the worker either reasonably knew or could have been 
expected to know.13 
Not surprisingly, most workers who brought tort suits against their employers for 
workplace injuries were unable to recover damages.14  One employment law scholar 
has estimated that a maximum of only thirteen percent of workers ever recovered for 
                                                                
7STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 892 (3d ed. 
2002). 
8PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 28-29 (2000).  
9Id. 
10MATTHEW BENDER, 20-96 PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 2.02 
(2004), LEXIS, Matthew Bender(R), By Area of Law. 
11WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 892.  
12Id.  The doctrine of contributory negligence barred recovery even if the worker was 
determined to be one percent at fault for his injuries and the employer was determined to be 
ninety-nine percent at fault for the worker’s injuries. Id.  
13Id.  
14Id. 
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their workplace injuries in tort suits, although more than seventy percent of their 
injuries were likely attributable to working conditions or employer negligence.15 
2.  Contemporary Tort Litigation 
Although the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk 
have almost disappeared, workers’ compensation laws have restricted the settings in 
which employees can bring tort suits.  One of the key features of workers’ 
compensation is exclusivity, meaning that when an injury falls under the applicable 
workers’ compensation statute, workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy 
available against an employer..16  Because injuries and illnesses resulting from 
workplace accidents fall under workers’ compensation, the exclusion provision 
prevents almost all workers from filing tort suits against their employers.17   
There are a few noted exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine, the most relevant to 
this note being an exception for intentional torts.18  Although states word their 
intentional tort exceptions differently, this exception typically applies when an 
employer intentionally caused the employee’s workplace injury or took action with 
knowledge that the injury was certain or substantially certain to result.19  Proving an 
intentional tort is a higher burden than proving traditional negligence (pre-workers’ 
compensation) because employees must prove their employers acted with intent, not 
simply that they acted without due care.20  This burden makes recovery for 
workplace injuries under present-day tort suits even more difficult than under pre-
workers’ compensation tort suits.   
3.  Advantages of the Contemporary Tort System 
One advantage of the current tort system is that tort suits function as a vehicle for 
employees to obtain safety information through discovery.  In tort suits, parties 
participate in a lengthy discovery process21 that involves the exchange of significant 
                                                                
15Id.  
16CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 1267 (1993).   
17WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.   
18Other exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine include dual injury and bad faith. Joan T.A. 
Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An Opportunity 
for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 409-10 (1998).  Dual injury occurs when 
an employee who has already suffered a workplace injury is deceived by her employer and 
this deception causes the employee to experience additional or aggravated injury. WILLBORN 
ET AL., supra note 7, at 974.  Bad faith refers to employer fraud in defending a workers’ 
compensation claim. Id. at 975.   
It is also important to note that tort suits against third parties are not barred by the 
exclusivity provision of workers’ compensation. Id. at 985.  Injured workers may sue 
manufacturers of the machinery or products that caused their injuries under product liability 
theories. Id.  In a few states, workers may also sue their employers’ insurance carriers for 
“negligent inspection of the workplace or negligent medical care.” Id. at 986. 
19
 27 AM. JUR. 2d § 203 (2005).  See also Gabel et al., supra note 18.  In some instances, 
an employer’s conduct may be so egregious that intent may be inferred. Id.  
20Gabel et al., supra note 18, at 409-10.   
21Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of 
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1701 (1992).  
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amounts of company information, thus reducing the information gap between 
workers and their employers.  During discovery, plaintiff workers obtain access to 
critical information concerning workplace dangers, safety measures, and employer 
actions.  As exemplified in Dan Ross’s story, this information can help to reveal 
workplace hazards to which workers are unknowingly exposed.22  In turn, this 
information can be used to lobby employers to reduce these workplace hazards.    
Another advantage of the current tort system is that when a worker plaintiff is 
successful, she can obtain full recovery for her injuries as long as her losses do not 
exceed any caps on awards imposed by the particular jurisdiction.  Unlike workers’ 
compensation, the tort system allows recovery for all economic and noneconomic 
losses,23 thus providing the most complete compensation available for workplace 
injuries. 
4.  Disadvantages of the Contemporary Tort System 
Tort suits are not effective at compensating for workplace injuries, however, 
because plaintiff workers are rarely able to overcome the exclusion provisions and, 
even when they do, there is no guarantee they will win or fully recover their losses.  
As I explained previously, achieving a successful outcome for workplace injuries 
under the present-day tort system is difficult because most injuries are governed by 
workers’ compensation24 or require the plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with 
intent,25 which is a high burden of proof.  Even if the plaintiff satisfies the required 
elements for employer liability, recovery is not automatic when the claims fall 
outside workers’ compensation.26  The plaintiff must go through a lengthy legal 
process27 and convince a jury that the employer is liable and that the plaintiff is 
entitled to the full amount of her damages.28   
The jury may grant a damage award lower than the plaintiff’s actual losses.  
Likewise, under the doctrine of comparative negligence, recovery can be reduced if 
the employee is partially at fault for the injury.29  Where states place caps on awards, 
                                                                
22Dan Ross, supra note 1. 
23SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.   
24WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.   
25Gabel et al., supra note 18, at 409-10. 
26See generally WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7.   
27SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1272.  The time between filing a tort action and trial 
can range from fifteen to twenty months. Id. (citing Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating 
Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability, 21 GA. L. REV. 843, 847 (1987)).  The 
delay caused by tort suits often causes worker plaintiffs “to accept low settlements rather than 
face the uncertainty of lengthy litigation.” Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Known Laws: 
Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1987). 
28MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 114 (7th ed. 2001).   
29SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266. See also FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 28, at 
440.  Under comparative negligence, the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced depending on the 
degree of the plaintiff’s negligence compared to the defendant’s negligence.  Id.    
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the caps can prevent a plaintiff from obtaining full recovery if her losses exceed the 
ceiling.30  
A further limitation persists in tort systems because tort suits alone do not 
provide sufficient incentives for employers to improve workplace safety.  Absent 
other incentives, employers may choose simply to ignore tort litigation and 
workplace safety where the threat of successful tort litigation is minimal.  As long as 
the employers pay out less in tort damages to injured employees than the cost of 
improved safety measures that would prevent such injuries, the employer has a cost 
incentive not to  improve workplace safety.31      
B.  Workers’ Compensation 
The failure of tort suits to supply employees with an adequate remedy for 
workplace injuries generated a national push for another form of compensation for 
employee injuries: statutory workers’ compensation.32  In 1908, Theodore Roosevelt 
successfully pressed for passage of the first workers’ compensation statute in the 
United States, which covered specific federal employees.33  In 1910, New York 
enacted the first state workers’ compensation act.34  By 1948, workers’ compensation 
statutes existed in every state in the United States.35   
1.  Historically 
The purpose of the early state workers’ compensation statutes was to provide 
employers with limited liability and employees with more certain recovery for 
workplace injuries36 by altering liability for workplace injuries from negligence to 
strict liability.37  The workers’ compensation system operated as a no-fault system in 
which employers were required to insure against workplace injuries and employees 
were automatically provided with compensation for workplace injuries, regardless of 
the employer’s fault.38  Workers’ compensation worked much like a contract between 
workers and their employers in which workers gave up their rights to sue in return 
                                                                
30FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 28, at 695.   
31Of course, there are many other factors, such as business reputation and employee 
morale, which exist outside the threat of tort suits that may provide incentives for employers to 
improve workplace safety.  
32WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 894. 
33Id. 
34Id. at 895.  The New York act was held unconstitutional in Ives v. S. Buffalo Railway 
Company, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) on due process grounds. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 895.  After the act was struck down, “‘fear of unconstitutionality impelled the legislatures to 
pass over the ideal type of coverage, which would be both comprehensive and compulsory, in 
favor of more awkward and fragmentary plans’. . .. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court held 
in 1917 that compulsory compensation laws were constitutional, the pattern of elective statutes 
had been set.” Id.   
35Id.  
36Id. at 900. 
37FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 29-30. 
38See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.   
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for access to certain benefits when they suffered a workplace injury.39  Workers 
favored workers’ compensation because they no longer had to bear the burden of 
workplace injuries.40  Instead, they automatically received some compensation for 
their injuries.  Employers favored workers’ compensation because it eliminated the 
uncertainty employers faced concerning unbounded tortious liability for workplace 
injuries, especially those outside their control.41   
The early workers’ compensation system was not without weaknesses.  
Originally, compensation was limited to industrial “accidents.”42  This limitation 
engendered confusion concerning exactly what injuries or accidents were covered.43  
In addition, early state statutes provided narrow coverage, usually only applying to 
specific hazardous industries, which employed less than half of the workforce.44  
Occupational diseases were not expressly included in state workers’ compensation 
acts, which sometimes precluded employees from recovering for such diseases.45  
Overall, the workers’ compensation system was criticized for being inadequate and 
unfair.46     
2.  The Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System 
The weaknesses of the workers’ compensation system spurred the National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (National Commission) to 
push for an improved workers’ compensation system.47  The National Commission 
pressed for a program that would provide “(1) broad coverage of employees and 
work-related injuries and diseases; (2) substantial protection against interruption of 
                                                                
39Id. at 309. 
40Id. at 310.  Before workers’ compensation statutes were enacted, workers bore a much 
higher burden for workplace injuries.  First, workers were unable to obtain full insurance 
coverage, relying on savings and other household means of insurance against workplace injury 
risk. Id.  Workers’ compensation alleviated this burden on workers by requiring employers to 
purchase insurance providing their entire labor force with injury benefits exceeding those 
available under the tort system. Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, The Adoption of 
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305, 311 (1998).  
Second, through the adoption of worker’s compensation, payments employees received after 
suffering a workplace injury increased. Id. 
41SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 310. 
42Id. at 1277.   
43See generally id.   
44WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 901.  In 1915, 41.2 percent of all non self-employed 
workers were covered by workers’ compensation statutes. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08 (1997).  The percentage of covered 
employees increased to 67.4 in 1920, and 75.2 in 1930. Id.   
45WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 902.  Statutes providing for “injury” compensation 
were often determined to include disability from disease, however, statutes limiting 
compensation to “injur[ies] by accident” did not include disability from disease. Id. 
46Id. 
47Id. The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws was created by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.  
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income; (3) sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services; (4) promotion of 
safety; and (5) an effective delivery system.”48  Over time, many states improved 
their workers’ compensation statutes at the urging of the National Commission.49 
Contemporary state workers’ compensation statutes provide for more expansive 
coverage than their predecessors.  Currently, about ninety-seven percent of workers 
are covered under workers’ compensation statutes.50  In order to be eligible for 
workers’ compensation under most state laws, a worker must satisfy the following 
elements: suffer a personal injury, resulting from an accident, arising out of and in 
the course of employment.51  Although traditionally most diseases were not 
compensable because they could not pass the accident test, most states have amended 
their workers’ compensation statutes to cover occupational diseases.52  
State workers’ compensation statutes provide an array of benefits including 
cash53 and wages, medical and rehabilitation expenses, and death benefits for 
surviving dependants.54  The compensation provided in each state varies in terms of 
the types, levels, and duration of the benefits.55  Employers finance workers’ 
compensation benefits by purchasing private or state workers’ compensation fund 
insurance or by self-insuring.56  The administration of workers’ compensation, 
including the payouts of benefits, is usually carried out by a state workers’ 
compensation agency.57    
3.  Advantages of the Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System 
The primary advantage of the current workers’ compensation system is that it 
provides certain recovery for injured workers with a minimal burden of proof.  
Compensation is automatic for any personal injury caused on the job as long as it 
“ar[ises] out of and in the course of employment.”58  Automatic compensation 
                                                                
48WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 902. 
49Id. at 903.   
50Id.  States vary concerning the percentage of employees that are covered, from only 
eighty percent in some states, such as Texas, to 100 percent in other states.   Less than 100 
percent of coverage occurs because of various exemptions, including employers with a small 
number of employees, particular industries, and particular occupations. Id. 
51WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 903.   
52Id.  State statutes normally include both an enumerated list of certain occupational 
diseases that are compensable and a general category allowing compensation for other 
diseases. Id. 
53WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 906.  Cash benefits include temporary and permanent 
partial and total disability and death benefits to surviving spouses and dependants.  Id. 
54LARSON & LARSON, supra note 44, at § 1.01.   
55WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 904.  Typically, cash-wage benefits comprise one-half 
to two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly salary.   Many states impose fee schedules 
limiting charges for medical expenses. Id.    
56Id. at 906. 
57Id. at 907. 
58SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.  
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provides an assured recovery to workers that is unavailable in tort suits because 
workers do not have to prove fault on the part of their employers in order to receive 
workers’ compensation benefits.59     
The workers’ compensation system incentivizes employers to prevent injuries 
from occurring.  When employers purchase insurance mandated by workers’ 
compensation, the insurance premiums are rated.60  Each employer is assigned to a 
specific insurance classification and then the employer’s experience is compared to 
other companies in the same insurance classification.61  The better the employer’s 
rating, i.e., the lower the amount of workers’ compensation it pays out relative to 
other companies in its classification, the lower the employer’s insurance premiums, 
and consequently, its costs.62  In this way, workers’ compensation encourages 
employers to prevent workplace injuries from occurring because the fewer injuries 
that occur, the less money the employer will have to pay in insurance premiums.63 
4.  Disadvantages of the Contemporary Workers’ Compensation System 
While the contemporary system encourages employers to improve workplace 
safety, thereby reducing payouts and insurance premiums, it fails to fully incentivize 
employers to improve safety.  Employers will continue paying out-of-pocket 
compensation to injured workers and accepting high premiums until such costs 
become higher than the cost of preventing injuries through improved safety 
measures.  Because the main goal of any company is usually profit maximization,64 
employers are likely to choose cost savings over worker safety. 
Another primary disadvantage of the current workers’ compensation system is 
that it does not fully compensate employees for workplace injuries.65  In successful 
workers’ compensation actions, workers are not entitled to compensation for all 
economic and noneconomic losses suffered.66  Instead, injured workers receive 
                                                                
59See generally id.   
60WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907. 
61Id.  
62Id.  
63Id.  Evidence is not definitive concerning the effectiveness of workers’ compensation at 
improving workplace safety. Id. at 1022.  However, according to Willborn, there is a 
reasonable basis for agreeing with Butler that experience rating “has had at least some role in 
improving workplace safety for large firms.” WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1022 (quoting 
RICHARD J. BUTLER, SAFETY INCENTIVES IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 1995 WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION YEAR BOOK I-82, I-87 (John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy P. Schmidle eds., 
1994)).  This conclusion does not extend to smaller firms because most of them are ineligible 
for firm experience ratings.  WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1024. 
64Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the 
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 431 (2001).   
65Hon. William A. Dreier, Beyond Workers’ Compensation: Workplace Comparative 
Fault and Third-Party Claims, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2003).  
66SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266. 
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compensation for medical costs and lost wages up to a certain amount.67  Most 
statutes also permit compensation for permanent disabilities, determined by a set 
benefit schedule.68  Essentially, workers cannot obtain full compensation for their 
workplace injuries when their losses do not fall within recoverable categories for 
medical costs, lost wages, and permanent disabilities, or when their losses exceed the 
ceiling set for recovery. 
The workers’ compensation system also perpetuates the information gap that 
exists between employers and employees concerning workplace safety.  Unlike tort 
litigation, workers’ compensation is mostly performed administratively without the 
aid of the court system.69  The lengthy process of discovery that occurs in typical tort 
litigation does not occur during workers’ compensation proceedings because the only 
information required for recovery is the fact that a personal injury occurred on the 
job and in the course of employment.  Without discovery, employees do not have 
access to critical workplace safety information that may otherwise be unavailable.70  
Without such critical safety information, employees cannot advocate improved 
safety measures within the workplace because they are unaware of both the current 
dangers to which they are exposed and the available safety measures that may be 
implemented.71   
C.  Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining provides a third mechanism for employees to address 
workplace safety by serving as a vehicle for obtaining information and a channel for 
improving safety.    
1.  Historically 
Congress passed legislation creating a system of collective bargaining to address 
the inequality in employee bargaining power.  In 1935, Congress passed the Wagner 
Act, now known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which allows 
employee unionization.72  The Act recognized employees’ rights to self-organize, to 
                                                                
67Id.  See also WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1023 (noting that in order to meet the 
adequacy standard set by the National Commission on State Workers’ Compensation Laws, an 
employer must provide workers’ compensation benefits that equal only two-thirds of income 
lost due to workplace injuries).  
68SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1266.   
69Workerscompensation.com, Frequently Asked Questions, General Information Section 
A, http://www.workerscompensation.com/federal (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).   
70Dan Ross, supra note 1.  In the case of Dan Ross, not until his wife filed suit and the trial 
entered discovery was it revealed that the chemical industry had known and concealed the 
dangers of its products for decades. But see FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 205 
(contending that under workers’ compensation, workers have a much greater incentive than 
under the tort system to report workplace accidents because all workplace accidents are 
potentially compensable).  When more workplace accidents are reported, this increases 
inspectors’ awareness of safety issues at the employer’s workplace. Id.  
71A full discussion of the unknown risks to which workers are exposed and the potential 
safety measures that could prevent them is provided in the text and endnotes listed herein 
under subheading A, titled “Proposed Solution.”    
72SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 251. 
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create labor organizations, and to bargain collectively.73  Congress created the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to oversee execution of these rights.74  The 
NLRB is responsible for enforcing these employee rights by exercising final 
decision-making power over collective bargaining charges filed in its office 
concerning violations of specified unfair labor practices.75  The NLRB also oversees 
the establishment of unions seeking to create collective bargaining relationships with 
their employers.76 
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, in partial response to public 
sentiment that the labor movement had been abusing its power.77  The Act left the 
core provisions of the NLRA text untouched and added a few sections.78  The Act 
mainly served to protect employers’ interests by “prohibit[ing] unions from coercing 
or discriminating against employees, from refusing to bargain, and from engaging in 
secondary boycotts.”79  The Act also explicitly stated that employees had the right to 
refrain from the collective bargaining activities listed within the Act.80 
2.  The Contemporary Collective Bargaining System 
Twelve years after the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin 
Act of 1959 and the text of the NLRA has remained essentially the same since its 
passage.81  The Landrum-Griffin Act expanded the secondary boycott prohibitions, 
regulated extended picketing, and restored voting rights to permanently replaced 
economic strikers.82  In 1974, Congress passed healthcare industry amendments to 
                                                                
73Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1533 (2002).   The language of the Wagner Act as amended states: “Employees shall have the 
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be 
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).”  
74SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252. 
75Id. 
76Id.  
77MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 92 (5th ed. 
2003).   
78Estlund, supra note 73, at 1533-34. 
79Id. at 1534; Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 
35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (1986).  Secondary boycotts consist of any unilateral union 
activity designed to induce one employer to cease doing business with another employer. Id. 
80HARPER ET AL, supra note 77, at 92-93.   
81Estlund, supra note 73, at 1535. 
82HARPER ET AL., supra note 77, at 94.   
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the NLRA that extended its reach to nonprofit healthcare institutions.83  Since these 
amendments, Congress has passed no other legislation aimed at the NLRA.84 
Under the current NLRA, unions form under the administration of the NLRB.85  
When a group of employees seeks to attain union status, the NLRB oversees the 
determination of what group of employees comprises an appropriate bargaining unit 
and whether a majority of the employees want union representation.86  An election is 
held and the winning union becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for the defined 
group.87  The employer is then barred from bargaining or making agreements with 
other employee bargaining units.88 
The NLRA imposes an affirmative duty on both employers and unions to bargain 
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”89  
Management must “seek union participation, consultation, and consent before taking 
action” that falls within these areas of mandatory bargaining.90  Safety is a 
permissive, not mandatory, bargaining subject.  Employers and unions may, but are 
not required to bargain on permissive bargaining subjects.91 
3.  Advantages of the Contemporary Collective Bargaining System 
The main advantage of collective bargaining is that the duty to bargain is 
intended to facilitate ongoing communication between the workforce and 
management in order to address concerns as they arise.92  This communication 
includes health and safety concerns.93  Workers bring safety concerns to employers 
through their union representatives, who strive to negotiate better safety initiatives 
within the company, often times giving concessions in other areas of employment 
that are less important to workers.94  In short, workers desiring to prevent workplace 
accidents and injuries may be able to obtain such prevention through the process of 
collective bargaining.95   
                                                                
83Id.    
84Id.    
85SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252. 
86Id.  
87Id. at 253. 
88Id. 
89MATTHEW BENDER, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12.01 (2004), LEXIS, Matthew 
Bender(R), By Area of Law.   
90Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions 
and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1998). 
91MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 13.04.   
92Id. at § 12.05. 
93SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 252. 
94See generally MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 12.05 and § 13.04.   
95In addition, a study by Gray and Mendeloff reveals that OSHA may have less of an 
impact on reduction of workplace injuries in unionized, rather than non-unionized plants. 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
526 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:513 
4.  Disadvantages of the Contemporary Collective Bargaining System 
Unfortunately, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of collective 
bargaining in the context of workplace safety.  To begin with, workplace safety is 
generally considered a subject of permissive bargaining because employers and 
unions may, but are not required, to bargain over safety issues.96  To some workers, 
higher wages or increased benefits may be more desirable than enhanced workplace 
safety.97  If workplace safety is not an issue that the majority of the workforce wants 
to pursue, then the workforce will not gain increased access to safety information 
through collective bargaining.  Likewise, if the workforce as a whole desires 
workplace improvements other than safety, the union will negotiate with employers 
concerning these preferred issues, and the opportunity to encourage employers to 
increase safety within the workplace is wasted.  In addition, even if workers prefer 
safety initiatives to other issues or benefits, their demands may be ignored because 
employers may legitimately refuse to bargain about nonmandatory bargaining 
subjects.98  For this reason, collective bargaining is an unreliable process for ensuring 
prevention of workplace injuries. 
Not only does collective bargaining fail to ensure prevention of workplace 
injuries, but it also fails to provide compensation for injuries.  When employers put 
up roadblocks to a union’s pursuit of safety initiatives in the workplace, injured 
workers are left without recourse through collective bargaining because the NLRA 
has no provision for private enforcement.99  Instead, the NLRA is aimed at “illegal 
forms of employer opposition.”100  When workers feel that an employer has violated 
their rights or the NLRA, they may file a grievance with the NLRB.101  The NLRB’s 
regional offices investigate the charge and determine whether to issue a complaint, 
which is then heard by Administrative Law Judges on the NLRB.102  After the 
hearing, a decision is issued by the NLRB, which seeks to remedy any unfair labor 
practices that occurred.103  Workers may receive back pay if they were wrongfully 
                                                          
Wayne B. Gray & John M. Mendeloff, The Differing Effects of OSHA Inspections on 
Manufacturing Injuries: 1979-1998, 16 (no date) (on file with author).  
96Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and the Labor-
management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L .J. 159, 163 (1996). 
97See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital 
Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984).  
98MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 13.04.  If workers are unable to impose their 
safety demands through permissive bargaining, they are prohibited from using economic 
action, such as a strike, to enforce such demands. Id.  This phenomenon is properly put into 
words by Finkin: “American workers will not be heard in the workplace unless American 
managers want to listen.” Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the “Representation Gap,” 3 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 415 (2001).  
99Estlund, supra note 73, at 1552. 
100Id. at 1537. 
101HARPER ET AL., supra note 77, at 103. 
102Id.  
103Id. 
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discharged, but NLRB decisions do not contemplate providing compensation to 
injured workers.104  
Another disadvantage of collective bargaining is that it covers only ten percent of 
the workforce.105  Although collective bargaining is available to every member of the 
workforce, in order to obtain union representation, a group must complete the 
process for becoming the company’s sole collective representative.106  Presently, 
ninety percent of the workforce is employed in companies where unions are not 
preferred.107  These employees thus cannot pursue increased safety through a 
collective bargaining process.108   
D.  The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
The first major national attempt to address workplace safety occurred in 1970 
with the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).109  
1.  Historically 
OSHA established three federal agencies responsible for executing federal policy 
in the area of occupational safety and health, covering nearly all private sector 
workers.110  First, OSHA created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
to determine standards, compliance, and violations.111  Second, OSHA established 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to research and to propose 
new safety and health standards.112  Finally, it created the National Advisory 
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health to advise the Department of Labor 
and Health and Human Services on OSHA.113  Through these agencies, Congress 
hoped to carry out the Act’s essential purpose of improving workplace safety.114   
2.  The Contemporary Application of OSHA 
OSHA regulates employers through specific enumerated safety standards and a 
‘general duty clause,’ which requires a safe workplace even in the absence of 
specific standards.115  OSHA promulgates three types of standards, including interim 
                                                                
104Estlund, supra note 73, at 1552. 
105Id. at 1546. 
106See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.   
107Estlund, supra note 73, at 1546. 
108See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16.   
109Id. at 1293. 
110WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1026. 
111Id.   
112Id.  
113Id. 
114U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, at 
http://www.osha.gov (2005) (last visited Feb. 7, 2005); WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 
1025.  Since its inception, the Act has undergone minimal changes. Id.   
115SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1295-96. 
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standards, which were issued during the first two years of the Act;116 emergency 
temporary standards, which can be issued with minimal procedure for up to six 
months; and permanent standards, which require a formal procedural process before 
being issued.117   
OSHA enforces these standards by conducting inspections of workplaces and 
issuing citations for violations.118  OSHA conducts inspections pursuant to both 
regular inspection programs and employee complaints of violations.119  When 
violations are discovered, OSHA can require the employer to eliminate the violation 
within a specified period of time or fine the employer anywhere from $0 to $70,000 
per violation, depending on the offense and its gravity.120  
3.  Advantages of the Contemporary OSHA System 
Since its passage, OSHA has reduced the number of injuries to workers.  From 
1970 through the present, workplace fatalities have dropped by over sixty percent 
and injuries have dropped by forty percent.121  This reduction has occurred in part 
because of the inspections and fines generated by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration.122  Large fines, sometimes as much as $7,000 per day for 
failure to correct violations,123 encourage employers to comply with OSHA 
standards.  The fact that employers are prohibited from knowing when an inspection 
will occur124 provides an incentive for employers to achieve and maintain compliance 
on a daily basis,  not just during inspections.  
Employees are active participants in ensuring that their employers comply with 
OSHA standards.  When an employee files a request for inspection based on 
reasonable grounds for concluding that an imminent danger exists in the workplace, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is required to conduct an 
inspection.125  The employee is permitted to accompany the OSHA inspector during 
                                                                
116Considerable controversy erupted when the Act became effective in 1971, causing the 
numerous interim standards to be permanently adopted. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 
1027-28.  Of the more than 4,400 standards, 600 were deleted in 1978 and another 153 in 
1984. Id.  Those interim standards that were not deleted remain in effect, constituting the 
majority of the OSHA standards presently in effect. Id.  
117WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1026-29. 
118Id. at 1031. 
119Id. 
120OSHA Statistics, http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/oshafacts.html (2003) (last visited Jan. 
25, 2005).  In 2003, OSHA conducted 39,798 federal and 59,290 state inspections, finding 
227,637 violations and issuing fines of $153,690,380.  Id. 
121Id.   
122Id. 
123Id.   
124WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1031. 
125SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1315-16.  The imminent danger must be a danger of 
which workers are aware, consequently, requested inspections do not protect employees from 
dangers of which their employers, but not they, are aware. Id. 
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the inspection and bring an action for injunctive relief if she believes that the 
Secretary of Labor has improperly elected not to do so.126    
In addition to employee participation, OSHA helps prevent injuries to workers in 
the chemical industry by setting maximum exposure standards and warning 
requirements for harmful substances to which chemical workers may be exposed in 
the workplace.127  In 1983, OSHA instituted a Hazard Communication Standard to 
ensure employees are advised of hazard information.128  The purpose of the standard 
is to inform “workers of the effects of work-related hazardous chemical exposure… 
enabl[ing] workers to play a meaningful role in their own health management.”129  
Armed with this information, workers may be able to take action to protect 
themselves from exposure or choose jobs that entail lower risks of exposure.130  
4.  Disadvantages of the Contemporary OSHA System 
Although OSHA has helped to inform workers of safety risks and reduce 
workplace injuries, it is a flawed system.131  OSHA issues standards that provide 
employees with safety information, but OSHA’s promulgation of standards lags 
behind the present day risks to which workers in the chemical industry are exposed.   
Since its inception, OSHA has issued only fifty permanent standards132 and twenty-
four substance-specific health regulations.133  With tens of thousands of chemicals 
being used in the workplace daily and more than 1000 new chemicals introduced into 
the workplace each year, OSHA is ill-equipped to conduct the research necessary to 
determine the danger and toxicity levels of every chemical and promulgate the 
necessary regulations.134  Moreover, the National Cancer Institute has determined 
that for over half of the 110 chemicals it classifies as having or likely to have 
                                                                
126Id. at 1316.  Employee participation in OSHA enforcement also has a downside.  First, 
the opportunity to accompany an OSHA inspector is typically provided “only to unionized 
employees in a plant that has an employee safety representative.” James A. Gross, The Broken 
Promises of the National Labor Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act: 
Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and Justice, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 351, 367 
(1998). Second, employees often hesitate to report safety problems at their workplaces 
because of “exclusion from participation in the inspection process, fear of retaliation, and 
unawareness of rights.” Id.  
127Edwards, supra note 27, at 5. 
128Id. (citing Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986), effective November 
25, 1983).  
129
 Edwards, supra note 27, at 5, citing 45 Fed. Reg. 53, 281 (1983). 
130See generally Edwards, supra note 27. 
131According to Gray and Mendeloff, the impact of OSHA inspections on reducing 
workplace injury rates has “declined substantially over time.” Gray, supra note 95, at 2.  
132WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1030. 
133Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2.   
134Virtual Hospital, A Digital Library of Health Information, Cancer Prevention: What 
You Need to Know, Occupational Cancer, http://www.vh.org/adult/patient/cancercenter/ 
prevention/preventionoccupational.html (last modified April 2001). 
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carcinogens, OSHA has either no standards or insufficient standards.135  The National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has urged OSHA to modify “existing 
exposure limitations or promulgate new regulations for over 100 chemicals.”136  As 
this evidence and the story of Dan Ross indicate, OSHA is unable to keep pace with 
the needs of regulation in the chemical industry to ensure that its standards and 
regulations protect workers from exposure risks.137 
A lack of resources also prevents OSHA from ensuring that businesses under its 
authority comply.  As one OSHA administrator noted, “the current law is inadequate 
to deal with serious violators, repetitive violators, [and] situations where people are 
put at risk day after day.”138  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is 
responsible for ensuring the compliance of over six million entities, but it has less 
than 2000 federal inspectors available to conduct inspections.139  In 2003, OSHA 
conducted almost 100,000 inspections,140 which accounted for less than two percent 
of all of the establishments OSHA must regulate.  The disparity between the number 
of inspections and the number of covered establishments, coupled with insignificant 
fines,141 allows for some companies to maintain substandard workplace safety 
conditions with little risk of serious OSHA sanctions.142 
                                                                
135Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2. Another problem arises from the fact that the 
cost of compliance with such standards is often much more expensive than the regulatory fines 
that are actually imposed, encouraging some companies to rebuff compliance. David Barstow 
& Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A1 
[hereinafter Deaths on the Job].   
136Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 2. 
137Typically, manufacturing firms have more knowledge concerning the risks of their 
products and processes than the government and its administrative agencies.  Firms are also 
able to gain this information more readily than the government, often through the normal 
course of business.  Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy 
and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 286 (2004). 
138MATTHEW BENDER, supra note 89, at § 197.01. 
139David Weil, Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction 
Industry, 20 J. POL’Y & ANALYSIS & MGT. 651 (2001).   
140OSHA Statistics, supra note 120.   
141Gray, supra note 95, at 1.  According to Gray and Mendeloff, the penalties imposed for 
employer violations are low in comparison to the cost of reducing many workplace hazards. 
Id.  This occurrence, along with the fact that many workplaces are not inspected, accounts in 
part for the decline in OSHA’s impact on workplace injuries during the last 20 years. Id.   
142McWane, Inc. is a prime example of how a company can fall through the cracks of 
OSHA enforcement.  Since 1995, nine deaths, 4,000 injuries, and 420 OSHA violations have 
been recorded at the company.  Nancy Ramsey, Television Review: Violations, Fines and 
Business as Usual at an Iron Foundry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at E5.  McWane’s federal 
health and safety violations number more than its six major competitors combined. David 
Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, An Indifference to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2003, at A1 [hereinafter At a Texas Foundry].  In 1999, one of McWane’s plants, Tyler Pipe, 
was cited by OSHA for “31 instances of inadequate guarding on machines.” Id.  By the 
following year, 60 percent of the 70 maintenance workers in Tyler Pipe’s north plant had been 
injured on the job. Id.  These workers were without protective equipment, including aprons, 
boots, and safety shields. Id.  And, if the workers reported suffering injuries from the 
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Another disadvantage of OSHA is that it does not allow for enforcement through 
private lawsuits.  OSHA provides no compensation and no personal avenue of 
recourse to employees who are injured in the workplace.  The sole remedy for an 
injured worker is to complain to the agency and rely on workers’ compensation for 
recovery.143 
E.  Summary of Efforts to Address Workplace Safety 
While tort litigation, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining, and OSHA 
all provide incentives for employers to address safety within their workplaces, these 
mechanisms still fail to adequately reduce the information gap between employers 
and employees and to provide an effective channel for improving workplace safety.  
Ideally, tort suits function as a vehicle for obtaining information through discovery, 
but because they are difficult to bring, tort suits alone do not significantly reduce the 
information gap.  Because workers’ compensation systems do not involve any 
comparable process of discovery, they do not provide a means for disseminating 
safety information to employees.  In addition, tort suits and workers’ compensation 
systems fail to fully compensate workers injured on the job and to effectively 
incentivize employers to improve workplace safety.  As I explained previously, 
where the risk of tort litigation and higher workers’ compensation ratings do not 
outweigh the costs of added safety measures, employers will elect to forego the 
added safety.  Collective bargaining does not force employers to consider workplace 
safety because safety is a permissive bargaining subject that employers can refuse to 
discuss.  When employers refuse to discuss safety, collective bargaining performs 
neither a means for obtaining information nor a channel for improving workplace 
safety.  Finally, while OSHA sets important standards and rules concerning 
workplace safety, inadequate resources prevent OSHA from setting timely standards 
in the chemical industry and from enforcing the regulations through inspections and 
fines.  The end result is that OSHA does not provide timely information on chemical 
dangers or compel  employers to meet or exceed OSHA standards.   
An analysis of tort litigation, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining, and 
OSHA reveals that existing mechanisms are not effective in conveying information 
to employees and promoting safety.  This limitation is particularly true in the 
chemical industry where knowledge is key for workers like Dan Ross.144  Unlike a 
                                                          
hazardous conditions of the plant, they were typically subject to discipline. Id.  Company 
records show that more than 350 workers were subject to discipline after reporting injuries. Id.  
The situation at Tyler Pipe exemplifies the fact that ‘the current law is inadequate to deal with 
serious violators, repetitive violators, [and] situations where people are put at risk day after 
day.’ Deaths on the Job, supra note 134.  It is the workers at these companies that are most at 
risk of experiencing occupational injuries and illnesses.  
143SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1319-20. 
144Private manufacturers prefer ignorance to research centered on the negative impact of 
their products because this research will negatively affect them. Wendy E. Wagner, Common 
Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and 
the Environment, 53 DUKE L .J. 1619, 1634-36 (2004).  These negative affects include high 
out-of-pocket research costs, a lack of market benefits from conducting safety research, and an 
absence of certainty concerning what the testing results will indicate. Id.  Industries are 
reluctant to conduct research or reveal known information concerning the long-term safety 
levels of their products or activities, and, they even “lobby against laws requiring them to 
share even basic internal information.” Id. at 1637. 
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gaping hole on the shop floor, the dangerous propensities of chemicals may not be 
obvious to employees.145  In some cases, no one knows the risks of certain 
chemicals.146  In others, the chemicals are not adequately labeled.  And in still others, 
employees are not fully informed of the risks of exposure.   
These information gaps can leave employees vulnerable.  When chemical 
workers do not have timely or complete information on the toxicity of chemicals to 
which they are exposed, they are unable to take steps to protect themselves.147  
Similarly, without accurate knowledge of the risks to which they are exposed, 
employees cannot demand comparable wages, and will assume more risk than they 
intend and incur injuries for which they will not be fully compensated. 
It is easy for employers to exploit employees in the chemical industry.  
Employers may know of certain risks chemicals pose to their employees and fail to 
disclose these risks.  Employers may also know of certain safety measures that 
would protect their employees, but choose not to adopt them.148  This choice is 
particularly problematic when the potential protection is only available through the 
employers and the only way employees can protect themselves is to resign.  
                                                                
145See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965). 
146Environmental laws are limited concerning mandatory testing of toxic substances.  
Wagner, supra note 144, at 1666-67.  Although it has the power to mandate testing for toxic 
substances, the Environmental Protection Agency rarely exercises this power, making such 
testing typically the exception, rather than the rule. Id.  Manufacturers must report the ‘adverse 
affects’ of toxic substances that are on the market, but this requirement is not readily enforced. 
Id. 
147Edwards, supra note 27, at 10. And even when employees are informed of the risks, the 
steps they can take to protect themselves may be limited in comparison to the steps their 
employers could take to reduce the risk involved.  Id. at 18. 
148Two safety measures chemical companies can utilize include industrial air filtration 
systems and biological testing.  An industrial air filtration system would directly reduce the 
levels of exposure that workers endure.  Refinery Self-Cleaning Filters Cut Labor/Disposal 
Costs, 15 WORLDWIDE ENERGY, Sept. 2004, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two 
Years.  Another option is for a chemical company to engage in biological chemical exposure 
testing of employees.  See Francis H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer’s 
Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 387 (1984).  Monitoring employees can potentially uncover 
precursors of occupational diseases or reveal the development of diseases. Id. at 389.  The 
incident rates of occupational diseases among workers can be reduced by removing the worker 
from a position where exposure occurs or by lessening the worker’s on-the-job exposure.  Id.   
Another safety measure chemical companies can employ is a chemical surface exposure 
kit.  For certain chemicals, such as beryllium, the greatest danger to workers exists from 
exposure to the dust emitting from the chemical, rather than exposure to the chemical itself.  
David Wichner, Firm Develops Kit to Test for Toxic Beryllium, THE ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 
18, 2004, available at LEXIS, News, Most Recent Two Years.  Berylliant Technologies has 
developed a simple kit that tests beryllium exposure on surfaces and produces results in under 
an hour. Id.  Chemical companies may be able to prevent workers from developing serious 
chronic diseases from exposure to chemicals like beryllium by implementing the use of a 
testing kit comparable to the one developed by Berylliant Technologies.  
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III.  WORKPLACE SAFETY ADVANCED THROUGH BOARD REPRESENTATION 
A.  Proposed Solution 
There is a need for a better solution to the problem of workplace safety in the 
chemical industry;149 a solution that reduces the information gaps that exist between 
employers and employees, provides a reliable means of encouraging employers to 
improve workplace safety, and adequately compensates workers when they are 
injured.  The following proposal addresses the first and second prongs of this 
suggested solution.  The third prong remains an important issue for which a better 
solution is also needed; however, this note focuses only on the first and second 
prongs because they are particularly important in an industry like the chemical 
industry, while the problem of workplace injury compensation applies universally.  
In this section of the note, I propose a solution to the problem of information 
gaps and inadequate safety measures in the chemical industry.  My solution is to 
provide a form of employee representation on the board of directors.  This 
representation will enable chemical workers to gain access to critical safety 
information and to use that information to encourage employers to improve safety 
measures within the company.150  Likewise, when exposure injuries occur, employee 
                                                                
149This note focuses on the chemical industry and chemical exposure safety in order to 
exemplify the application of an employee representative model in the workplace and its 
strengths and weaknesses.  This note focuses on workplace safety because it is a critical 
employment concern, demonstrated by the passage of OSHA and the establishment of the 
workers’ compensation system.  This topic is further narrowed to the chemical industry 
because chemical exposure risks and injuries are of particular concern in the area of workplace 
safety.  The dangers chemicals pose are usually discoverable only through scientific research 
and testing.  Scientific research continually reveals new risks of chemical exposure, even for 
chemicals to which workers have already repeatedly been exposed.  Employers in the 
chemical industry often have more information than their employees concerning the risks of 
chemicals to which the employees are exposed.  In addition, in many cases, employees can 
utilize increased safety measures that would reduce the risks of chemical exposure incurred by 
workers.  Instituting an employee representative model in the chemical industry to address 
safety will help to lessen the information gap existing between employers and their employees 
and provide a forum for employees to encourage their employers to implement increased 
safety measures.   
The employee representative model may have other potential applications outside of the 
chemical industry setting.  The model is most appropriate in settings where (1) an information 
gap exists between employers and their employees with respect to a certain aspect of 
employment, and (2) workers stand to benefit when representation will reduce the information 
gap and provide workers with a channel for addressing improvements with respect to this 
particular aspect of employment.  For example, the model could be used in other industries 
where safety is also of particular concern to workers.  The model could be used in 
manufacturing industries where employees are at risk of being injured by the machines they 
operate.  In addition, the model could also be used in other industries to target employment 
issues aside from safety, such as training, that are of particular concern to workers.     
150
 Edwards, supra note 27, at 18-19.  
Employees have relatively poor information about workplace risks and little control 
over them.  Most workers facing toxic exposures do not understand the risks or the 
manner in which their own behavior can affect those risks.  Furthermore, because of 
the nature of the employer-employee relationship, the worker may have little control 
over work practices or the types of materials or safety equipment used in his plant.  
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board representatives can bring the issue to the boardrooms, thereby encouraging the 
company to take steps to understand how the injury may be prevented in the future. 
An important question that arises from this proposal is whether an employee 
representative can ever have enough of a voice in the board of directors to initiate 
changes to workplace safety.  An employee representative is only one of many 
directors, holding a minority position on the board.  It may be naïve to believe that 
one representative would be able to persuade all of the directors on the board to 
address particular safety issues or adopt increased safety measures.  However, by 
raising safety issues not otherwise exposed, the employee representative may force 
board members to confront these critical issues.  Over time, the repeated voicing of 
concern about safety in the workplace could create a change in board culture 
concerning how the board views and approaches workplace safety.  While not a 
panacea, this effect is valuable in the long run for promoting and improving 
workplace safety in the chemical industry.   
B.  Explicit Role of the Employee Representative 
Providing employees with representation on the board of directors will give them 
increased access to information on the risks to which they are exposed in the 
workplace151 and the safety measures their employers could adopt to reduce such 
risks.152  Board representation will also equip employees with a means of 
encouraging their employers to adopt such safety measures.153  The primary role of 
the employee representative will be to: (1) reduce the information gap that exists 
between workers and their employers concerning workplace safety and available 
safety measures; (2) use that information to encourage employers to implement 
safety measures, thereby reducing chemical exposure and injuries, and; (3) use the 
boardroom floor for initiating research on improving safety in the workplace.  
In this section of the note, I discuss three models for employee representation on 
the board of directors.  The first and most obvious method is allowing an employee 
of the company to serve on the board of directors.   The second method is to allow an 
employee of the company to serve on the board of directors, but provide him with a 
professional consultant on which to rely.  The third method is to hire an outside 
professional to serve on the board and represent the employees’ safety interests.  
C.  Employee Representative on the Board of Directors 
The first method of employee representation is having an employee of the 
company serve on the board of directors.   
                                                          
Moreover, even when hazards are known, workers may have insufficient bargaining 
power to obtain wage premiums. 
Id.  
151Robert N. Stern, Participation by Representation, Workers on Boards of Directors in 
the United States and Abroad, 15 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 396, 406 (1988). 
152Id.  
153EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 105 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 
1999). 
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1.  Advantages of this Model 
Employee representation on the board of directors provides workers with a strong 
voice that is heard through a formalized process.154  Workers possess far greater 
knowledge of the production process than management.155  A worker serving on the 
board will be able to bring this information to the boardroom, which will help the 
board to make more informed decisions concerning workplace safety.  When making 
strategic decisions, directors will have the opportunity to consider the concerns of 
workers, concerns that are not heard through the traditional collective bargaining 
processes or the other avenues I have discussed.156  Through participation on the 
board of directors, employees will be able to influence the decisions made by the 
firm.157 
The flow of information through board representation is two-fold.  Not only will 
directors gain access to information possessed by workers, but workers will gain 
access to critical information possessed by directors and management that normally 
does not reach the workforce.158  Because the employee director also works on the 
shop floor,159 he will have continuous access to the workforce for disseminating the 
information gained through board participation.  The workforce will also have easy 
access to the directors to communicate its safety concerns.  The result is that 
employees will gain access to increased information concerning workplace safety 
risks and available safety measures and they will be able to use this information to 
encourage their employers to improve workplace safety.160  Workers will also use the 
information to demand higher wages to compensate for the risks to which they are 
exposed.161  
When employers improve workplace safety at the insistence of the employee 
director, the representation can benefit the workers and their firms.  Increased 
workplace safety results in fewer occupational injuries and illnesses, and 
consequently, reduces the claims for compensation under workers’ compensation or 
tort suits. 
                                                                
154Stephen Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational 
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 985 (1998) [hereinafter Privately Ordered]. 
155Id. 
156Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 901 (1993) [hereinafter 
Human Capital]. 
157Steven Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 657, 675 (1996) [hereinafter Participatory Management]. 
158Id. at 690.  
159Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985. 
160Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690.  
161Id. at 722.  Under many theories concerning workplace risks, it is generally thought that 
“[w]ithout full knowledge of the hidden but discoverable health risks that result from exposure 
to toxic substances, workers cannot be said to have accepted the risks voluntarily.”  Edwards, 
supra note 27, at 10. 
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2.  Disadvantages of this Model 
Although the employee director model has many advantages, it also has many 
disadvantages.  Some of these disadvantages arise from the fact that the director is 
also an employee.  An employee will possess a high level of knowledge concerning 
the workforce and operations at the plant level, but he may only be familiar with a 
small fraction of the firm’s operation due to the limited scope of his job duties.162  
And, because an employee director is primarily hired to perform his shop or plant job 
at the firm, he likely has no experience in performing company management 
functions.  The employee director may not possess the level of sophistication 
necessary for forming company policy and making complex corporate decisions.163 
A second problem that could arise is alienation.164  Other workers may perceive 
the director employee as a member of management and treat her differently than they 
treat other co-workers, which could impede the flow of information regarding their 
safety and other concerns.  This alienation could prevent the worker representative 
from effectively performing her functions.  
Another disruption will occur in the exchange of information if the worker 
representative chooses to act in his own self-interest.165  Providing an employee with 
control rights in the company increases the employee’s motivation to use his 
newfound authority irresponsibly.166  If the worker believes that concealing certain 
information from management and the board is in his self-interest, his restraint may 
prevent the board from having the information necessary to make the best corporate 
decisions, including safety decisions.167  Conversely, the employee director may take 
actions as a board member that benefit him, but are detrimental to his fellow 
workers.168  Of course, if the employee representative acts in his own self-interest, he 
can easily be replaced by another employee.169 
                                                                
162Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985. 
163LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 137 (5th ed. 2001); see also Marleen O’Connor, Employees 
and Corporate Governance: United States: Labor’s Role in the American Corporate 
Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Employees 
and Corporate Governance].  The employee likely will have no interest in corporate 
decisions, such as investment policies, that do not directly impact her working conditions or 
benefits. Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 723.   
164Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 1000. 
165Two types of shirking that may affect the flow of information include negligence and 
laziness.  Participatory Management, supra note 158, at 682. 
166Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 1068. 
167See generally id. at 1011. 
168Contractarian corporate analysis assumes that all people are “rationally selfish actors.”  
Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 406.  So, while trustworthy behavior does exist, it is always 
possible for people to act in their own rational self-interest. Id. 
169See generally MARIANNE JENNINGS, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 25 KEYS TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 24 (2000).    
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The duty of loyalty is also a check on any director’s decision to act in his self-
interest.170  As a fiduciary, the director owes certain duties to the company, one of 
which is the duty of loyalty.171  The duty of loyalty requires that a director exercise 
utmost loyalty to the company’s shareholders.172  When a director has a conflict of 
interest, which includes self-interest in the decision or transaction, his actions under 
the duty of loyalty are judged by intrinsic fairness.173  Intrinsic fairness allows for the 
punishment of directors who use their position to their own personal benefit by 
engaging in conflicted transactions that are not entirely fair to the corporation.174 
A final problem with having an employee serve on the board of directors is the 
potential for conflicts of interest.  As a member of the board, the employee owes a 
fiduciary obligation to the company on whose board he sits, which includes the 
company’s shareholders,175 whose main goal is typically profit maximization.176  The 
director also owes an obligation to his fellow workers to adequately represent their 
safety concerns and advocate to the board improved workplace safety.  These safety 
interests may be inconsistent with the shareholders’ goal of profit maximization.177  
Fortunately, corporate law provides much flexibility to directors, enabling them “to 
take actions that protect other corporate constituencies while reducing the value of 
the shareholders’ economic interest in the firm.”178  Therefore, the director 
representative has the opportunity to persuade the board to make decisions 
                                                                
170Id. at 40.  Some of the other obligations that arise from directors’ fiduciary duties 
include “exercising good business judgment, not seizing an opportunity from the company for 
their own profit, [and] watching carefully for conflicts in their work with the board.” Id.   
171SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 163, at 137. 
172ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 182 (1995). 
173SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 163, at 137. 
174Id.  When a director violates the duty of loyalty, other members of the board, or 
shareholders, may file suit against him on the corporation’s behalf. Blair & Stout, supra note 
64, at 425.  
175Blair & Stout, supra note 64,  at 431-35.  Shareholders’ interests are considered 
primary; however, directors may also consider the interests of other firm players who have a 
residual interest in the firm, including creditors, executives, and workers. The author further 
noted that in addition to shareholder’s interests, corporate directors may also consider the 
interests of executives, employees, and equity investors as well.  Id. at 435. 
176Id. at 431. 
177Loizos Heracleous & Lan Luh Luh, Who Wants to be a Competent Director? An 
Evaluation Tool of Director’s Knowledge of Governance Principles and Legal Duties, 2 
CORP. GOVERNANCE 17, 20 (2002).   The role of employee representatives is to represent their 
fellow workers, however, the law requires board members to principally serve shareholders’ 
interests.  Bainbridge, supra note 154, at 725.  Bainbridge also provides argument that the 
employee conflict of interest problem is overemphasized, because it is no more problematic 
than the conflicts faced by outside directors representing other constituencies. Participatory 
Management, supra note 157, at 725.  In addition, Bainbridge’s article cites Summers, who 
asserts that corporate law is well equipped to police conflicts of interest, rather than disallow 
them. Id. 
178Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 428. 
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improving workplace safety at the cost of shareholder profits, as long as the firm 
remains profitable enough to retain its shareholders.179   
D.  Consultant to Employee on the Board 
Another option for employee board representation is to allow an employee to 
serve on the board, but to provide the representative with a professional consultant. 
1.  Advantages of this Model 
The primary advantage of providing a professional consultant to the employee 
representative is that it ameliorates the problems created by having an 
unsophisticated employee on the board.  The worker representative likely has no 
experience making complex management decisions and lacks the sophistication 
necessary to make such decisions.180  However, a professional consultant will possess 
these skills.  The professional consultant will be able to advise the employee director 
concerning matters of company policy, such as investment decisions, that the 
director would otherwise be ill-equipped to decide.181  The consultant can assist the 
director in advocating safety issues in the boardroom and advise the director on how 
to best encourage the board to make decisions improving workplace safety.    
The employee director-consultant model also retains the advantages that the 
employee director model encompasses.  The employee director-consultant model 
engages a formalized process of exchanging information between workers and the 
board.182  The worker representative will be able to bring his operations knowledge 
and worker safety concerns to the board183 and she will be able to gain access to 
safety information from the board.184  As a worker on the shop floor,185 the 
representative will have continuous access to the workforce to disseminate this 
information and gather information on worker safety concerns.  The employee 
director will be able to use all of the information gained to encourage the firm to 
improve workplace safety,186 fulfilling the purpose of the representation.   
                                                                
179Id. at 435. 
180According to John Witt’s case study, workers who did not want to partake in 
participatory management “often cited lack of managerial expertise as the reason.”  Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory 
Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 823 (1998).   
181In Sweden, employees have had a statutory right to board representation since 1973.  
Klas Levinson, Employee Representatives on Company Boards in Sweden, 32 INDUS. REL. J. 
264 (2001).  Klas Levinson conducted a study of this representation and the statutorily created 
educational system developed to support it.   The study revealed that over half of the employee 
board member participants preferred expert counseling as an aid to their representation. Id. at 
273. 
182Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985. 
183Id. 
184Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690. 
185Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985. 
186It is important to note that even when employees gain critical safety information 
through board representation, they many have a limited ability to take steps to reduce the risks 
they experience on the job because they likely have little control over the firm’s operational 
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2.  Disadvantages of this Model 
Supplying the employee director with a professional consultant does not resolve 
all of the disadvantages that arise from having an employee serve on the board of 
directors.  Other workers may still see the employee director as a member of 
management and alienate him, disrupting the information exchange process.187  In 
addition, even with a professional consultant to rely upon, the employee director may 
decide to act in his own self-interest.188  A professional consultant does not address 
the possibility that the employee will have a conflict between his duty to 
shareholders and his focus on safety.  The employee director is primarily supposed to 
represent the safety interests of the workforce, but the employee also owes a 
fiduciary obligation to company shareholders.189  Shareholder interests or profit 
maximization may be inconsistent with the safety interests of the workforce, 
imposing a conflict of interest problem on the employee director.190 
E.  Outside Representative on the Board 
Hiring an outside board representative is a better model than either the employee 
director or employee director-consultant model for providing board representation to 
address worker safety interests in the chemical industry.    
1.  Advantages of this Model 
The outside director model has many of the advantages of the employee director 
and employee director-consultant models, plus some added advantages.  To begin 
with, the outside director will serve an important informational and persuasive 
purpose.  Through ongoing communication with employees in all aspects of the 
plant, the director will be able gain valuable knowledge concerning plant operations 
and worker safety concerns.191  The director will also collect key safety information 
held by the board and top management through board participation, which she can 
then communicate to the workforce.192  These exchanges of information will 
facilitate the director’s representation of worker’s safety interests, equipping her with 
the knowledge necessary to advocate safety initiatives within the firm.  As a board 
member, the director will be able to use her position to encourage the firm to 
implement safety measures that would reduce or eliminate chemical exposure 
injuries and illnesses.  When the company adopts these increased safety measures, 
the director’s representation advances the prevention of chemical exposure injuries 
and illnesses.  
                                                          
practices or use of safety equipment.  Edwards, supra note 27, at 18.  This fact makes it 
important that the director representative not only provide workers with safety information 
gained through board membership, but also firmly push the company to increase the safety 
measures used. Id. 
187Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 999. 
188Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 406. 
189Id. at 435.    
190Id. at 431. 
191Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 985. 
192Participatory Management, supra note 157, at 690.  
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Unlike an employee director, the outside director will be able to more fully and 
purposely participate in all board decisions, even those not involving wages, benefits 
or working conditions.193  The ideal outside director would have safety and worker 
representation experience194 and also the skills and expertise to form company policy 
and make complex decisions, such as selecting officers, investments, and technology 
systems.195    
In addition, an outside director196 may receive more respect than an employee 
director from other board members who view him as a professional equal.  The board 
members may scrutinize the outside director with less wariness and more deference 
than an employee on the board.197  The board will likely consider the director to have 
the skills and qualifications necessary for being a competent member of the board, 
capable of fully participating in the myriad of decisions made by the board each year.    
Another advantage of hiring an outside director over an employee to represent 
worker’s interests involves the self-interest problem.  While, as previously explained, 
an employee may be tempted to act in his own self-interest once he obtains a 
powerful position within the firm, an outside director is less tempted to act in his 
own self-interest.198  The director is paid to be a board member and represent 
employees’ interests199 and he probably does not have other self-interests relating to 
the particular company because his board position is the only position he holds 
within the firm.200  In contrast, an employee director may see his position on the 
board as less of an opportunity to serve worker safety concerns and more of an 
opportunity to secure extra benefits or better circumstances in his non-director 
employment position.201  If a hired outside director does choose to act in his own 
self-interest, like an employee representative, he can always be replaced.202  Hiring 
outside, rather than inside the company, also enables market forces to take affect, 
ensuring that the best representative holds the outside director position.203 
                                                                
193Ruth Barratt & Nada Korac-Kadabadse, Developing Reflexive Corporate Leadership: 
The Role of the Non Executive Director, in  2 CORP. GOVERNANCE  3, at 3233 (2002). 
194JENNINGS, supra note 169, at 23-24.    
195Id.   
196An outside director serves on the firm’s board of directors, but has no internal 
employment position within the firm. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a 
Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 900 
(1996).  In contrast, inside directors hold some other employment position within the firm, 
usually in a management position. Id. 
197See generally Participatory Management, supra note 157. 
198Id. at 725. 
199Id.  Workers assess their representatives mainly on the basis of their labor advocacy. Id. 
at 725. 
200See generally JENNINGS, supra note 169.  
201See generally Participatory Management, supra note 157. 
202JENNINGS, supra note 170, at 37.     
203The suggestion of creating a market for a hired employee representative has been 
proposed in the union context.  Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America’s Social Contract 
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Another aspect of board representation that prevents the outside director from 
acting in his own self-interest is the fact that, like an employee director, the outside 
director owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company on whose board he serves.204  
When an outside director engages in a conflicted transaction, including a self-
interested transaction, he may be liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty if his 
actions are not entirely fair to the corporation.205  
2.  Disadvantages of this Model 
There are some disadvantages to the outside director model.  First, the outside 
director model poses an information dissemination problem.  Because the director is 
not an employee, she has no direct or continuous contact with the workforce.  
Without some kind of regular and frequent contact with the workforce, the director 
will be unable to gain the knowledge possessed by the workforce.  Also, it will be 
more difficult for the director to gather information concerning the workers’ safety 
concerns and disclose safety information to the workforce acquired through the 
director’s board position.   
Alienation is another issue of concern in the information exchange process.  
Unlike an employee director, the outside director is not a member of the workforce, 
making it more likely that the workforce will perceive her as a member of 
management.206  If the workforce alienates the director hired to represent its interests, 
then it loses the opportunity to express its safety concerns and gain the critical safety 
information possessed by management and the board.  
In order to overcome the information exchange problem, a formal system of 
communication between workers and the outside director representative must be 
organized.  This system must ensure that workers have an ongoing means of 
communicating their operational knowledge, safety concerns, and other interests to 
the outside director and that in turn, the director has a means of conveying to 
workers important safety information acquired from the firm.  The system should be 
organized to instill worker confidence in the director’s competence and 
trustworthiness.  If the workers have confidence in their representative, then they 
will feel comfortable being open with him and supporting his counsel, furthering the 
information exchange process. 
In addition to information exchange, the potential for conflicts of interest is 
another factor with the outside director model.  The outside director, like an 
employee director, is hired to represent worker safety interests, which may be in 
conflict with the interests of the firm’s shareholders to whom the director owes 
fiduciary duties.207  However, as explained in the employee director model, corporate 
directors are allowed to consider the interests of other firm constituencies aside from 
                                                          
in Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137, 
147 (1999).  Kochan advocates the creation of a market for full-service unions, which would 
provide employees with a complete package of services, including “individual representation 
and … representation in corporate governance structures and processes.” Id. 
204
 SODERQUIST ET AL, supra note 163, at 137. 
205Id. 
206See generally Privately Ordered, supra note 154, at 999. 
207Heracleous & Luh Luh, supra note 177, at 20. 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
542 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:513 
shareholders.208  Although the board will have to mediate between the safety interests 
of employees, other constituencies, and shareholders,209 a director representative on 
the board will be able to bring employee safety concerns to the forefront of 
constituency considerations.  By advocating employee safety concerns through board 
representation, hopefully, the director representative will encourage the board to 
favor worker interests over the interests of other constituencies.   
Another conflict arises from hiring an outside director to represent employee 
safety interests; this conflict is the payment of compensation to the director.  
Although the director is hired to represent workers of a certain firm, it is the firm, 
and not the workers, that pays the director for his services.210  Director compensation 
is far from nominal; the average compensation for a board member at one of 
America’s 200 largest industrial companies was $68,300 in 1995, according to Pearl, 
Meyer & Partners.211  The high level of compensation received by a director 
representative may encourage her to disregard employee safety interests in order to 
appease the firm and, consequently, to protect her own economic interests.  If the 
director representative chooses to stifle her representation and advocacy of worker 
safety issues, then her representation will fail in its essential purpose.  
Perhaps one of the best solutions to the conflicts of interest a director 
representative will confront is the extension of fiduciary duties to employees.212  
Marleen O’Connor advocates extending director’s fiduciary obligations to 
employees.213  In fact, she claims that a precedent for such an extension already 
exists.214  This new fiduciary law would force directors to strike an equitable balance 
between competing interests of employees and shareholders.215  The new duty would 
                                                                
208Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 428. 
209Id. at 436. 
210See generally JENNINGS, supra note 169.  Board members typically receive 
compensation for their services in the form of retainers or automatic annual fees; nominal fees 
paid for attendance at board and committee meetings; share payments; and incentive or benefit 
packages, which may include performance-based stock options, pension and retirement plans, 
and deferred compensation plans. Id. at 33-35.   
211Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board – The 
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 155 (1996).  Directors may also 
negotiate lucrative consultation agreements with the companies they serve. Id. at 156.  It is 
estimated that consultation arrangements can increase a board member’s compensation to well 
over $250,000 per year. Id. 
212Employees and Corporate Governance, supra note 163, at 104.  O’Connor explains that 
the three main advantages workers stand to gain from the extension of fiduciary duties 
include: 1) promotion of greater workforce-management cooperation; 2) increased rights to 
disclosure about corporate affairs that affect them; and 3) encouragement of “worker 
participation in strategic corporate decision making.” Id. at 107. 
213Human Capital, supra note 156, at 958.  “When shareholders’ and employees’ interests 
directly conflict … studies indicate that directors refrain from expressing their moral 
sentiments about employees due to their belief that they have a legal obligation to maximize 
shareholder wealth.” Id.    
214Id.    
215Id. 
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more formally legitimize the director representative’s promotion of employee safety 
interests.  This result contrasts with the informal rule allowing, but not requiring, 
directors to consider the interests of other constituencies besides shareholders.  By 
formalizing the consideration of employee interests in the boardroom, the rule may 
reduce the outside director’s perceived need for quieting his representation in order 
to preserve his economic interests in the firm.  Extending fiduciary duties to 
employees will also reduce the barriers an employee representative faces as a 
minority on the board of directors because it will make all board members 
accountable to the interests of employees.   
If board member’s fiduciary duties are extended to employees and effective 
communication is maintained between the outside director and the workers he 
represents, the outside director model provides the most advantageous form of 
employee board representation.  In addition to having the sophistication and 
experience of an outside consultant, the outside director will be able to fully 
participate in all board decisions.216  Other board members may treat the outside 
director more like a professional equal than they would treat an employee.217   
Because the outside director is not otherwise employed by the firm, he will be less 
likely than an employee to view his position on the board as an opportunity to serve 
his own self-interests.218 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the current methods of addressing workplace safety reveals that a 
better approach is needed for the protection of workers like Dan Ross in the chemical 
industry.  Contemporary compensation systems, which include tort litigation and 
workers’ compensation, are inadequate at reducing the employer-employee 
information gap, incentivizing employers to prevent workplace injuries, and 
compensating employees for injuries.  Legislatively introduced programs, which 
include collective bargaining and OSHA, provide insufficient means for employees 
to secure safety within the workplace.   
In response to these failures, I suggest a proposal that makes employees active 
participants in improving workplace safety.  I contend that having a director who 
represents employee safety interests on the board of directors is a viable solution to 
the problems of workplace safety in the chemical industry.  Employee board 
representation will address safety in the chemical industry by reducing the 
information gap between employers and employees and by serving as a channel for 
improving workplace safety.  Addressing workplace safety in the chemical industry 
is of particular concern because of the risks of exposure presented by chemicals and 
the inability of legislative standards to keep pace with the growing number of new 
and existing chemicals handled in the chemical industry each year.  
I considered three different methods of providing this representation for workers 
in the chemical industry, including an employee representative, and employee 
representative aided by a professional consultant, and an outside director 
representative.  The outside director model emerges as the best form of employee 
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representation, particularly if fiduciary duties are extended to employees.  As a 
representative of worker safety interests, the outside director will serve as a 
facilitator of communication between workers and the board or firm management.  
The director will act as a voice on the board for workers and disseminate to workers 
critical safety information gained through board participation.  The director will use 
the information gained through representation to encourage the employer to improve 
safety measures within the company.  When the company implements safety 
measures that reduce the risks of exposure faced by chemical workers, the interests 
of workers are heard, more injuries and illnesses caused by chemical exposure are 
prevented, and compensation claims for workplace injuries are reduced. 
GWEN FORTÉ 
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